European Union (Brussels)
10 November 2010
document
The executive summary of the final report of the European Union's Election Observation Mission to the 2010 House of People's Representatives and State Council elections in Ethiopia:
Ethiopia held its fourth elections to the House of People's Representatives (HPR) and State Councils on 23 May 2010. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) was present in Ethiopia from 14 April to 21 June 2010, following invitations from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). The EU EOM was led by Mr.
Thijs Berman,
Member of the European Parliament. The Mission deployed 170 observers from 25
European Union Member States, as well as, Norway, Switzerland and Canada to all the country's regions, to assess the electoral process against international and regional commitments for elections as well as the laws of Ethiopia. The EU EOM is independent in its findings and conclusions and adheres to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation commemorated at the United Nations in October 2005. On
Election Day, EU EOM observers visited 815 polling stations in every region of Ethiopia to observe voting and counting.
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The 23 May 2010 elections were held in a generally peaceful environment, as unanimously called for by all stakeholders. The relatively quiet election campaign by both the opposition and the incumbent, the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), grew in intensity in the very last stages of the campaign. Although, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) largely managed the electoral process in an efficient and competent manner, its handling of the consolidation process was less praiseworthy. The electoral authorities failed to dispel the opposition parties' lack of trust in their independence. While several positive improvements were introduced since the 2005 elections, there were negative developments in the practical application of the legal and electoral framework. As a result, the electoral process fell short of international commitments for elections, notably regarding the transparency of the process and the lack of a level playing field for all contesting parties. Insufficient efforts were taken to ensure a more equitable and representative electoral process.
The Ethiopian Constitution and legal framework provided an adequate basis for the conduct of genuine elections in line with international and regional commitments subscribed to by Ethiopia. The Constitution, Electoral Law and other election-related regulations protect political and civil rights and allow for genuine elections, as well as the freedoms of association, assembly, movement and expression. However, the practical implementation of some laws and regulations regarding elections deviated in certain cases from the principles underlying these commitments. The electoral process was therefore constrained, as was the full, non-discriminatory, enjoyment of fundamental rights.
The changes in the legal framework together with the fragmentation of the main opposition forces in the aftermath of the 2005 elections, as well as the imprisonment of leading opposition figures and the departure in exile of one opposition leader, resulted in a cumulative narrowing of the political space within the country. The ruling party's presence throughout the country was unrivalled by opposition parties, especially in rural areas which house up to 80% of the Ethiopian population.
The NEBE administered the elections in a competent and professional manner given its limited resources, overcoming significant technical challenges. However, some shortcomings were noted in the training of polling station staff and in the consistency and coherence of technical information received and aggregated by the electoral authority, such as complete polling station lists, which affected the overall transparency of the process. Insufficient measures were taken to increase the level of trust of some opposition parties in the impartiality and independence of the NEBE.
The NEBE registered 31,926,520 voters for the 2010 elections, out of approximately 37 million eligible citizens according to its own projections. This reflected a relatively inclusive register that included around 5 million more voters than in 2005. Voter registration was carried out in just six weeks, which is a relatively short period. Voter registration took place before the deployment of the EU EOM and was therefore not directly observed by the Mission. The lack of a centralised and computerised national voter register did not allow for any checks for multiple registrations or any audits.
Candidate registration was carried out in an adequate manner. The requirements for candidates were not discriminatory. The NEBE displayed commendable flexibility in agreeing to extend the deadline for candidate registration following a request by the National Joint Council for Political Parties. Unfortunately, it did not do the same for the Somali Region. The introduction of public financing for political party candidates was a positive measure, however, the amount was generally considered insufficient to conduct an effective campaign.
The number of complaints of campaign violations, harassment and intimidation -including cases of violence- voiced primarily by opposition parties and, to a much lesser extent, by the ruling party, increased in the last weeks of the campaign. The volume and consistency of complaints against the ruling party, local administrations and in some cases the police was a matter of concern that must be taken into account in the overall assessment of the electoral process. Beyond the repeated calls for peaceful elections, greater measures to limit possible harassment and intimidation could have been taken by the government and all political parties.
The freedoms of assembly, of expression and of movement were not consistently respected throughout the country during the campaign period, generally to the detriment of opposition parties. All parties favoured door-to-door canvassing, although some rallies were held -mainly by the EPRDF. Campaign activities were generally focused on the last week of the campaign, given most parties' lack of funds.
The media covered the main campaign events in a relatively neutral tone. However, state-owned media failed to ensure a balanced coverage, giving the ruling party more than 50% of its total coverage in both print and broadcast media. The airtime specifically allocated to the electoral campaign for parties and candidates was distributed proportionately to the different candidates. It was observed that the media were often very cautious in their reporting. The jamming of the Voice of America Amharic Service throughout the campaign period, and of Deutsche Welle a couple of days before the elections, reduced the possibility for voters to receive information from a wider range of sources. This was not compensated by other media, as the limited outreach of print and broadcast media reduced their role in providing voters with information to make an informed choice.
The separation between the ruling party and the public administration was blurred at the local level in many parts of the country. The EU EOM directly observed cases of misuse of state resources in the ruling party's campaign activities. The role of the kebele's (administrative unit that comprises rural communities or urban neighbourhoods) which are used to good avail in the development of local communities should be gradually reduced in the electoral process to prevent these situations from occurring. This could also help to increase the level of trust of opposition parties in the process. Even taking into account the inherent advantages of the incumbency, the Mission considers that the playing field for the 2010 elections was not sufficiently balanced, leaning heavily in favour of the ruling party in many areas.
The NEBE decided to retain exclusive competence in the field of voter education. The EU EOM considers that the voter information provided by the NEBE was generally insufficient and that too often, political parties and local administrations were the main exponents of voter education in rural parts of the country. The exclusion of civil society organisations from voter education, together with the new and more restrictive Ethiopian Charities and Societies Law, limited the potential role of local organisations in the electoral process.
The provisions for complaints related to voting, counting and consolidation were significantly strengthened in the last five years. Nonetheless, the EU EOM considers that further measures must be implemented to ensure that they provide the opportunity for effective legal remedy on election-related complaints, in light of opposition parties' lack of confidence in the independence and neutrality of the judiciary and the police. Additionally, the channels for complaint adjudication should be rationalised to avoid that offences go unpunished.
Election Day unfolded in a generally peaceful and orderly manner, with a high voter turnout. Secrecy of the vote was respected despite minor irregularities. The EU EOM observed an inconsistent application of procedures especially at the opening and closing of polling stations. Party agents, mainly from the EPRDF, and domestic observers were present in the majority of observed polling stations. Polling procedures were assessed positively by EU EOM observers in 87% of visited polling stations, while closing and counting were assessed positively in 66% of cases. In 25% of observed polling stations copies of results forms were not given to party agents and in nearly half, results were not posted outside the polling station, thereby compromising the transparency and credibility of the counting process.
The NEBE announced provisional results less than 48 hours after polling stations closed, thanks to a parallel system of communication allowing for the aggregation of polling station results at the national level. The consolidation process at constituency level was considered very problematic according to EU EOM observers. In 27% of cases observed, polling station results were different to those previously recorded by observers at polling stations. In several cases, incomplete or incorrect forms from polling stations were corrected or completed at constituency electoral offices. The transparency of the process was considered unsatisfactory in 40% of observed cases. Certain essential forms for the correct transmission of results to the national level were not filled in numerous constituencies.
A number of rallies against a very critical Human Rights Watch report followed the announcement of provisional results on the elections, which also served as victory celebrations for the EPRDF. At these rallies, banners were also visible carrying slogans against the EU EOM, suggesting that the Mission had "a political agenda" against the ruling party. Official results were released on 21 June and were accepted by most parties. Medrek and the AEUP rejected the results and unsuccessfully presented requests to the NEBE calling for nation-wide re-elections. Both parties appealed the NEBE decision at the Federal Supreme Court (FSC). The FSC confirmed the NEBE's decision.
The ruling party and its partner parties won 544 of the 547 seats to the HPR and all but four of the 1,904 seats in the State Councils. The participation rate was of 93.4%. An independent European Union Election Observation Mission to Ethiopia 2010 candidate and a candidate from one of the main opposition coalitions, the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (Medrek) won seats to the HPR. A candidate from a relatively smaller party, the Argoba People's Democratic Organisation (APDO), won the third seat. The APDO won three State Council seats. The All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) won one State Council seat. The results indicate that the EPRDF has a practically absolute control over both the lower legislative chamber and the State Councils.
A comprehensive list of suggestions and recommendations is included at the end of this Final Report for consideration by the relevant authorities in order to promote further improvements in certain areas of the election process. Key recommendations include:
• Measures are necessary to increase the participation and capacity of opposition parties, as well as the broadening of political space in Ethiopia. The return of exiled opposition leaders as well as the release of imprisoned opposition leaders would be important steps in this direction, restoring confidence in the democratic process. The financing of political parties and of election campaigns could be reviewed together with the implementation of capacity-building programmes for political parties, their members and their candidates.
• Steps should be taken to ensure a clear separation between the ruling party and the state and to avoid the misuse of state resources during the campaign. The NEBE should be provided with sufficient resources to reduce the need to resort to local administrative structures in electoral activities gradually, with a view to create an independent and trustworthy election management body. This would help to prevent the occurrence of abuses of power and use of state resources at the local level. Furthermore, this measure could improve the level of confidence of many opposition parties in the electoral process.
• The voter register should be computerised for future electoral processes to allow for the implementation of essential safeguards to ensure its accuracy, as well as greater transparency by providing copies of the voter register to all political parties. The NEBE could consider the creation of a permanent and national voter register.
• The NEBE should take measures to increase the transparency of the electoral process and improve the perception that some opposition parties have of its impartiality. These measures should include publishing and communicating all electoral information to the contesting parties. The NEBE should also review some Election Day procedures, notably the design of forms and the training provided to polling station staff and constituency electoral officers to improve the consolidation process.
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