Kenya to Spend $1.2 Billion Doubling Power Grid, Building Wind-Farm Link
Kenya Electricity Transmission Co., the state-owned power-grid operator, plans to spend $1.2 billion by 2014 expanding the network to import energy from neighboring Ethiopia and provide a link to a wind farm in northern Kenya.
The project, which mainly will involve the installation of high-voltage lines, will more than double the size of the national grid, Joel Kiilu, chief executive officer of Ketraco, said in an interview from Nairobi, the capital, yesterday.
“The capital requirements and planning required to build transmission lines as demand increases is massive,” Kiilu said. “We are working to get access to as many people as possible, at the cheapest rates.”
Ketraco was created by Kenya’s government in December 2008 to build and maintain new electricity-transmission lines as East Africa’s biggest economy looks for ways to provide power to areas where it’s in high demand and short supply. The company took over the job from Kenya Power and Lighting Co., the monopoly distributor that still controls 3,400 kilometers (2,113 miles) of power lines built before Ketraco was set up.
Kenya, with a population of 39 million, aims to increase installed power capacity by almost nine-fold to 9,000 megawatts over the next 20 years, while targeting a sustained annual economic growth rate of 10 percent. The government expects to grow by at least 4.5 percent in 2010 from 2.6 percent a year earlier. Nairobi generates more than 60 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.
South Africa, the continent’s biggest economy, has the capacity to generate about 40,000 megawatts.
Ethiopian Reporter Survives Jail to Receive Prize
Special to the NNPA from the Global Information Network –
Dawit Kebede, one of the first journalists to be jailed for independent reporting on Ethiopia's 2005 election violence and among the last to be released under a presidential pardon nearly two years later will receive the International Press Freedom Award on Nov. 23 from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
Other prizewinners are Nadira Isayeva of Russia, Laureano Márquez of Venezuela, and Mohammad Davari of Iran.
Unlike many of his colleagues who went into exile, Kebede chose to stay in Ethiopia after receiving his freedom from jail in Addis Ababa, where he had been crammed into a communal cell with 350 political prisoners.
In 2008, he was detained for an article titled “freedom of writing should be respected” in the Awramba Times. Today, it is the country's only Amharic-language newspaper that dares question authorities, notes CPJ.
"Here are three things people should know about me," the 30-year-old Kebede says. "First, it is impossible for me to live without the life I have as a journalist. Second, unless it becomes a question of life and death, I will never be leaving Ethiopia. Third, I am not an opposition. As a journalist, whatsoever would be a governing regime in Ethiopia, I will never hesitate from writing issues criticizing it for the betterment of the country.”
ADDIS ABABA — Ethiopia freed opposition leader Birtukan Mideksa on Wednesday, saying it had granted a plea for pardon from her.
Eritrea threatens Ethiopia
The Ethiopian counterpart responded with the following...
Why we must engage on our Forum
Over the past week, Ethiopian, East African, and human rights organizations all over the world have published a flurry of open letters, condemning Columbia’s decision to host Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi at this week’s World Leaders Forum. The letters reopen the old, rankling, and unsettled debates raised by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2007 visit, questions about whether it is in line with the University’s mission and stature to invite controversial—some would say dictatorial—world leaders to speak to students and faculty members on campus. As these questions reemerge, the Columbia Political Union wishes to express its position that the invitation of Zenawi, and all events fostering political dialogue and awareness, are both in tune with our own mission and that of the University as a whole.
Yet, such events may only be beneficial to students and the world when the University serves as a neutral and critical moderator. In this light, the previous inclusion of an unedited quote from the Ethiopian government’s mission on the WLF’s online event description must be described as an unfortunate and sullying gaff. The unqualified statement implied University support for Zenawi and his government. The retraction of the quote and the reaffirmation in a statement by Columbia’s Director of Media Relations, Robert Hornsby, that the University remains a neutral party and that Zenawi’s speech will be followed by an open question-and-answer period, have done much to assure that the event will, in line with the goal of WLF, “advance lively, uninhibited dialogue.” Still, the mishap has raised reasonable doubts.
CPU maintains that this event can prove beneficial, especially in exploring the criticisms of Zenawi used to urge Columbia to reconsider its invitation. Detractors accuse Americans of viewing Zenawi, an American ally in Africa, without scrutiny—and this is fair. His is not a name to make the major news cycles, not a name to enter daily conversation like Ahmadinejad’s. Profiles of the man in the West are a mixed bag—questioning his two-decade tenure and his treatment of opposition parties and the press, but applauding his push for stability, economic growth, and self-sovereignty. Most Americans could not tell their East African counterparts whether they consider the man a dictator, or a democrat in the throes of difficult national transitions.
Giving such a man a podium does not mean endorsing his ideas, as has been argued. It does, however, mean drawing attention to the man. And as long as we are true to our spirit—and Hornsby holds his word that a free and robust questioning of Zenawi occurs, possibly forcing him to confront with candor the questions he may be able to avoid in his own nation—that attention will hopefully lead to reflection and investigation in the news cycle, and among individuals at Columbia and beyond, which will benefit the world.
True, if Zenawi is a dictator, he may spin the event any way he likes at home, casting this as an endorsement. But spin is spin, and a dictator seeking self-legitimation will find it somewhere. Weighing the benefit of awareness, dialogue, pressure from our corner, and the manipulation of that dialogue by outside sources is a complex calculation. But to shy from controversy, to avoid engaging with a tricky situation, to cease even trying to support uninhibited and fruitful dialogue in the world, would be misguided and out of line with our mission as a group, and Columbia’s as an institution. As long as the exchange is truly free, spirited, and critical, it is wise to err on the side of engagement.
Sara Jacobs is the general manager. Emily Tamkin is the director of operations and the Spectator editorial page editor. Alex Frouman is the treasurer. Mishaal Khan is the events coordinator. Alisa Lu is the director of communications. Samuel Roth is the publisher and a member of the Spectator editorial board. Tim Lam is the CubPub.org blog editor-in-chief. Chris Chan is the technical director. Iman Nanji is the publisher of the Columbia Political Review. Mark Hay is the editor-in-chief of the Columbia Political Review.
Hung up on the Horn of Africa: We should let the fractious region go its own way
With the exception of countries the United States has wrecked through wars — Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan — the area where we have done the most damage in recent years probably is the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is generally defined to include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, the “horn” part referring to the fact that the African coastline in the northeast takes that shape. Looking at the region strategically, Sudan belongs to the Horn as well.
I take full responsibility for my own part in what has occurred in the Horn, having served as U.S. ambassador and special envoy to Somalia during the relatively ruinous years of 1994 and 1995, but there is a fundamental problem for the United States in devising policy toward the area: The people there have an unfortunate, pronounced predisposition to settle problems among themselves by warfare and violence.
They are fractious and heavily armed. If they ever lack arms, they do not hesitate to sell whatever they have to sell to get them — including their allegiances or humanitarian food deliveries from abroad intended for their hungry populations. The regime of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, a sometime-favorite of American leaders, provided the most recent example.
The people of the Horn are also enterprising in getting assistance, including military assistance, from American administrations. It took the Ethiopians and some of the Somalis no time to figure out that America’s hot button since 9/11 has been “Islamic terrorism.” Suggesting that one’s enemy was infected by — or even in touch with — al-Qaida or some other radical Islamic group was enough not only to get U.S. military aid, but even to get the Americans to attack the enemy in question.
That particular vulnerability on America’s part has become even more severe in recent years as the U.S. military has come to play a large role in determining and carrying out U.S. policy in the Horn. Part of this phenomenon is an accident of history.
For many years the United States had no military command dedicated to Africa. When I was deputy commandant of the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa., in 1993-1994 I wrote a monograph in which I noted that there were military commands for Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia but none for Africa. This, I argued, was to slight Africa: It showed a lack of respect that there was no military-to-military contact and none of the ample Department of Defense resources flowing to Africa.
The Pentagon, certainly not because of my advocacy, created an African Command in 2008. Because none of the African countries where AFRICOM might have liked to have been located wanted its headquarters, AFRICOM continues to be based in Germany. Its one base in Africa is in Djibouti, in the Horn.
In late 2006, claiming radical Islamic activity in Somalia, Ethiopia, backed by U.S. arms, aircraft, intelligence and possibly special operations forces, invaded Somalia. The Somalis hate the Ethiopians a lot, dating in part from the 1970s when the United States supported the Ethiopians against them, then switched sides and supported the Somalis in a Cold War-era regional war. Eventually the Somalis “convinced” the Ethiopians to go home in 2009.
The bad part for the Somalis came in the fact that the only stable government it’s had since its armies forced dictator Mohamed Siad-Barre out in 1991 was an Islamic Courts regime that was in power in Mogadishu for the six months preceding the Ethiopian invasion. This government was relatively moderate in Islamic terms. (When I was in Somalia in the 1990s, Somalis in general were moderate Sunni Muslims. The women did not go veiled, wore bright colors and played public roles in society.)
By the time the Ethiopians had been driven out, the Islamic Courts had morphed into the more radical and religiously rigid al-Shabab. In the meantime, the world had organized a Somali “transitional” government in Kenya — after years of arm-twisting and bribes — that was installed in Mogadishu under foreign, African Union protection. The members of this “government,” busily fighting among themselves, are now cornered in a few square blocks in Mogadishu, and the African Union troops, from Uganda and Burundi, are cursing the day they got dragged into the intra-Somali conflict.
My guess is that pretty soon al-Shabab will overrun the transitional government enclave, forcing the flight of the fickle government forces and obliging the AU to leave. I fervently hope the Americans at the base in neighboring Djibouti do not intervene to help the government hold on against the al-Shabab forces. But I don’t rule that out.
In the meantime, elsewhere in the Horn, Ethiopia and Eritrea, both with undemocratic, heavy-handed governments, continue to quarrel with each other as they have since Eritrea’s breakaway from Ethiopia in 1993. Djibouti hangs on — a tiny, reasonably democratic state of 850,000 living like a chihuahua sleeping among pit bulls.
Sudan is what needs to be watched now. The basic problem there is that an agreement brokered in 2005, including by the United States, provides for the people in the south to vote on independence in 2011. The South undoubtedly will choose independence. But the current government is based in the north, in Khartoum, and most of the country’s oil wealth is located in the south — a recipe for conflict. The Obama administration is having internal policy differences over what U.S. policy toward Sudan should be.
I would suggest that Sudan’s fate is, almost entirely, none of America’s business. Last of all should U.S. military resources based in Djibouti come into play in seeking to determine one outcome or another in Sudan.
Just because you think you can do something doesn’t mean you should, particularly in the Horn of Africa.
By Dan Simpson, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Alemayehu G. Mariam: Ethiopia: Indoctri-Nation
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